WWII Aviation Industry Part 2

I've been toying with a what-if scenario about an alternative buildup strategy for the French air force in the 30s. One of the biggest problems with the Armée de l'Air was that much of its fighter force included MS-406 and MB-151. The first was substandard on a number of issues against the ME-109e; the latter was even worse. This resulted from France changing governments almost every year for several years, which messed up its strategy, not to mention industrial inefficiencies and interservice frictions between the army and the air force.

France ordered Curtiss H-75 Hawk fighters from the US, but production wasn't fast enough to cover the Armée de l'Air's needs. Orders also required hard currency, which was a problem given the awful state of France's economy at the time. The H-75, as a stopgap solution, was definitely better than the Morane-Saulnier and the Bloch 151. The P-40 and the Wildcat did not enter service until 1940. Those weren't an option, and we can pass on the hapless Brewster Buffaloes.
     So... Alternatives?
     Buying Hurricanes and Spitfires would have been awesome, but those weren't available, given that the RAF required their whole production. Russian fighters were not an option either for a number of reasons. So, who's left? Fokker, for one!
     The D. XXI, though obsolescent, was still better than the MS-406 and MB-151. It did surprisingly well in the hands of Dutch, Danish, and Finnish pilots who flew it in combat. Indications were that the Fokker G1 would have done well in its category. Most of the Fokker aircraft destroyed during the Netherlands' defense were those caught on the ground.
     The Dutch aircraft industry was altogether anemic and would not have been able to provide France with enough of either type. Buying those outright would have required cash, which was an issue for France. Therefore, building them under license in France might have worked better in this respect, and also because these were relatively easy to build. It would have required massive retooling of several builders, but this could have been accomplished in 1937 or 1938, leaving a very narrow window to deliver the hundreds of aircraft France needed to replace its less-performing fighters.

Arsenal VG33

I believe assembling British fighters and their Rolls-Royce engines all under license, especially the Hurricane, which was easier to build than the Spitfire, would have been another valid short-term approach until acceptable French-designed fighters became available in sufficient numbers (such as the promising Arsenal VG 33 or even an updated Dewoitine 520). Fokker might have been more willing to accept such an agreement, more so than Hawker or Supermarine. (This is entirely debatable since I don't know how the respective governments of the UK and the Netherlands might look at this.) I’m guessing that this strategy would have been hard to sell in the politically charged environment of France's government and industrial circles. It certainly would have been a painful blow to Gallic national pride as well. On the other hand, it could have kick-started several French manufacturers with firm orders for large numbers, which had been lacking throughout the 1920s and 1930s. As a result of this, French manufacturers didn’t have the financial strength to tackle major retooling and the fast-paced industrial output that the Armée de l’Air desperately needed on the blitzkrieg’s eve.
     Building foreign aircraft under license would have required a strong political will and the means to discipline French industrials who weren't always as cooperative as they could have been. There was indeed resistance to the 1936-1937 mergers that the Air Ministry imposed upon France's manufacturers, specifically to address production issues (see related article here). Production suffered from the 40-hour work week (no overtime as far as I know) and politically motivated strikes. Meanwhile, German workers toiled away 50+ hours per week. We do know that a Hurricane required about 10,000 work hours to build, vs. 12,000 for a Spitfire (correct me if I'm wrong). The Me-109e took a bit less time than this (although I haven't found confirming data). The MS-406 took at least as many, and the MB-151 even more, close to 18,000-20,000 work hours. You can see how badly the situation could develop with such numbers.
     Another aspect of the troubles that the Armée de l'Air faced was the slow pace at which France industries emerged from the global Depression (compared with the UK and Germany). A significant part of France’s industries had been lost during WWI, so all that had to be rebuilt before and during the Great Depression. The population (potential workforce) discrepancy between France and Germany + Austria + the Sudetenland gave the Axis an advantage of almost 2 to 1. Competition was a tall order seen from any angle.
     A number of other issues plagued the French military buildup of the 30s. The lack of consistency with design and production strategies from the French government (I do repeat it) was one of the leading problems. France’s Air Ministry issued some really bad design directives in the mid-30s, mostly as cost-saving measures. This resulted in a carnival of notoriously ugly and instantly obsolete machines (especially for bombers and recon aircraft), as well as a lot of wasted time and money. The lack of coordination among the aviation industry saw hundreds of aircraft getting built, but missing key components, like their armament, radios, and other cockpit equipment. French engine manufacturers could hardly keep up with the accelerated production of airframes in 1939-1940. Poor planning also led front-line units to use their own pilots to fly their older aircraft back to factories and exchange them for newer types. Why not use the thousands of available Polish pilots eager to be involved? They could have easily handled these deliveries at the very least. Most of them eventually ended up in the UK. 

Incidentally, I found information I didn't know. Under France's Third Republic (1870-1940), the head of state (President of the Republic) wasn't elected by universal suffrage but by the parliament (Senate and Chamber). The president appointed a prime minister to head the government. Technically, the prime minister wielded more power than the president. However, the Chamber could force the prime minister to resign with a vote of no confidence. With a heavily divided parliament (sounds familiar?), such as France's before WWII, this resulted in prime ministers lasting about six months, thus the political instability of the country. A profound rivalry between socialists and conservatives (sounds familiar?) was rooted in the Depression's economic problems (1929-1939) that had provoked widespread poverty and unemployment in France, especially during the second half of the 1930s. Added to this, French demography suffered from about half of its population between the ages of 20-25 being missing due to the 1.4 million KIAs in WWI and about six million casualties overall, a disaster for France's demography 20 years later. I'd call this a perfect storm...

     Despite France's mountain of challenges and failures, the Armée de l'Air and the RAF (respectively 600 serviceable fighter aircraft out of 2,900, and 360 for the RAF deployed in France vs. 850 Me-109e) were involved in inflicting on the Luftwaffe nearly 1,500 aircraft losses plus 488 damaged, about 28% of its front-line strength or 36% overall. French fighters accounted for 600-1,000 of the Luftwaffe's losses. I could not find stats on German losses attributed to the Hurricanes or the number of Me-109s shot down. The RAF had deployed about 260 Hurricanes to France and lost 119 of those during the invasion. Spitfires were not sent to France. It is a tribute to the valor of the Allied combat crews, given that they lacked any combat experience at the onset. This affected the Luftwaffe's chances of prevailing during the ensuing Battle of Britain.
     All of the issues described in this article led France to falter catastrophically after emerging from WWI as a world leader in aerospace. France could have done better. Bad governance in the face of a crisis dooms nations. Folks facing the same today, with glaring incompetence and criminal hubris to boot, ought to heed this tale. Anyway... This was a pie-in-the-sky idea. Let the Flak do its worst.

Click here for the previous article on WWII Mergers

Click here for the next article on British Aviation in WWII.

Happy Gary Gygax Day

 Oyez! Oyez! Oyez!

Click on the image for the full resolution.

WWII Aviation Industry Part 1

French aviation of the 30s always puzzled me as regards its industrial basis and organization. I decided to look this up. Here's what I found. This is a departure from my usual D&D-related focus. Wargamers amongst you may find this interesting.

Mergers & Nationalizations

Reading about post-WWII French aircraft manufacturing can be confusing because of the acronyms used in the late 40s and 50s. After some frustration, I seized the bull by the horns and drafted a diagram showing the most important manufacturers after WWI. Those wargamers among you will recognize many in the diagram’s top row. These manufacturers did not possess the industrial capacity to provide modern aircraft as quickly as the French Armée de l’Air needed them to face the growing Nazi threat in the mid-30s. Many were financially strapped due to the global economic depression at that time. In desperation, the French government nationalized almost all of these manufacturers. The plan was to reorganize the entire industry to increase production output and relocate as many manufacturing centers away from Paris, which was deemed too vulnerable to an invasion. The government also saw an urgent need to improve coordination between its military and thus-far-private corporations.

        There wasn’t a good way to cobble together fifteen or more disparate companies with workshops spread all over the country, not to mention handling disgruntled workers' unions. The reorganization was more or less based (as far as I can tell) on the location of factories, resulting in six industrial groups positioned geographically: Center (Paris), North (roughly northwest of Paris), West (Atlantic coast), Southwest (Bordeaux), Meridional (Toulouse), and Southeast (Marseille). This approximated the original intent. The acronyms roughly translate as National Air Works of (…region). In truth, those areas overlap. Most of these companies had their HQs in one Parisian suburb or another. This was hardly avoidable since the capital city is the nation’s nerve center. Several companies’ assets ended up being split among different industrial groups. For example: Potez (Southeast & North), Lioré & Olivier (Southwest & Southeast), and Breguet (Southeast, North, plus one part that escaped nationalization and kept operating independently under its brand name). One company isn’t shown on the diagram: Avions Voisin. They converted their business to build automobiles after government orders for combat aircraft dried up at the end of WWI.

        After WWII, France’s aerospace industry was in tatters, since most of its assets had been taken away by German occupiers or wiped out during Allied bombing raids. Over the following sixty years, much of all this was rebuilt and eventually combined to form Aérospatiale (the folks working with the Brits to build the Concorde). Finally, Aérospatiale became the foremost part of establishing the multinational corporation called Airbus, now competing directly with Boeing. Much of the latter’s assembly work is completed in Toulouse.

        The exact status of these nationalized businesses isn’t all that clear (to me). Some managed to continue operating under their brand names after WWII (such as Potez). Most were swallowed entirely and ceased to exist as separate business entities. Marcel Bloch was the primary owner and administrator of Bloch Aircraft. The government bought him out but put him in charge of SNCASE (Southeast Aviation). He left in 1941 after disagreements with the Vichy government. He had been sent to a concentration camp during WWII, survived, and resumed control of his company after the war under his new name: Marcel Dassault. His new business lived on to produce the famous French Mirage fighters. One final corporation escaped nationalization altogether: Latécoère. It was best known for its transatlantic seaplanes. It still operates to this day, a world-spanning business specializing in airplane parts (fuselage sections, doors, electrical equipment, and so forth).

Engine Manufacturers

        Oddly, these companies weren’t nationalized in the 30s, despite a dire need for modern aircraft engines at that time. Salmson (Société des Moteurs Salmson, SMS) exited the aerospace business after WWI and began building automobiles. It ceased operations in 1962; its brand name ended then, and the remaining assets were bought out by other businesses. Renault was another source until 1936, when it spun off its Caudron subsidiary and other aircraft engine divisions to focus on its core automotive business. Lorraine-Dietrich provided engines until 1935, when financial failure enabled Amiot and Bloch to acquire its aircraft engines business. Gnome et Rhône bought out the remainder of Lorraine-Dietrich in 1941. Another small engine manufacturer of WWI, Société Clerget-Blin et Cie., was eventually acquired by SNECMA in 1947 and ceased to operate under its brand name.

        Hispano-Suiza was an important source of aircraft engines in WWI. France’s branch, known as Société Française Hispano-Suiza, was established in 1923 and cut ties with its Spanish parent company at the French government’s behest. It designed aircraft engines and cannons up until WWII, especially for the MS-406, Dewoitine 520, and Arsenal VG33. It later built foreign manufacturers’ engines under license. SNECMA bought the French division in 1970 and renamed it Safran Transmission Systems in 2016. The division continued since then to build aircraft engines, thrust reversers, and other equipment. The original Spanish company, still under its Hispano-Suiza brand, survives to this day, specializing among other things in gnarly-looking concept and sports cars.

        Gnome et Rhône built aircraft engines, especially during WWI. Much of its business fell victim to WWII. They built engines for M4 Sherman tanks for a short period, but to salvage what was left of the company, it was nationalized in 1945 and rebranded as Société Nationale d'Etude et de Construction de Moteurs d'Aviation, otherwise known as SNECMA. The latter went on to build the Atar jet engine powering Dassault Mirages, and the Concorde’s Olympus 593. In 1974, the company established a joint venture with General Electric called CFM International to build the highly successful CFM-56 engines used on Boeing and Airbus aircraft. It changed its brand name to Safran in 2016 and now operates as a world supplier of commercial and military jet and turboprop engines, as well as the propulsion system for the space-bound Ariane 5 Vulcain rocket.

Click on the image, open it in another tab, & enlarge it to get the full-resolution version.

Click here for the article on the woes of French wartime aviation
and why they took place.